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POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN RESISTANCE BEFORE THE ALLIED INVASION OF FRANCE: THE UNDERGROUND

Description

This study reports on the political evolution of the underground resistance movements of Western and Central Europe, noting the predominantly leftward drift, discussing the various political groups competing for leadership, and considering certain political potentialities inherent in Resistance Europe today.

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SUMMARY

1. Underground and guerrilla forms of resistance present sufficiently different political problems to require separate treatment. Underground resistance, generally the prevailing form in Western and Central Europe, may be divided into two types: opposition, and pure resistance. Opposition tends to be passive and "political" in the sense of retaining pre-war party characteristics. Pure resistance tends to be activist and "non-party" in the sense of disavowing pre-war party characteristics.

2. Although men of all classes take part in resistance, the organized groups in Western and Central Europe have come increasingly to rest their ultimate dependence on the working classes. This fact tends to reshape the character and appeal of resistance, the more so as resistance becomes organized and powerful.

3. The experience of war and German occupation has produced three dominant mass attitudes: a hatred of the invader; a passion for decent conditions of living; and a revulsion against any form of state control which imperils individual liberty. These attitudes are crystallized in the words "national liberation," "socialism," and "democracy." These sentiments, with the addition of the belief in activism and the desire for the "non-political" organization of resistance, constitute the common platform of most resistance groups.

4. Any political group desiring to capture the leadership of the pure resistance must adjust its strategy to the sentiments created by the experience of Nazi occupation. That is, it must be activist and "non-Party" in character, and must be in favor of "national liberation," "socialism," and "democracy."

5. Most parties of the Right have been unable to make this adaptation and consequently remain simply in the opposition

(when they do not collaborate). The conspicuous exceptions are certain Rightist groups in Denmark.

6. The Socialist and Social Democratic (Second International) parties, still handicapped by the weakness of their pre-war leadership, have also failed to make a successful adaptation, in spite of the degree to which their pre-war programs would seem to correspond to the present mood of the resistance.

7. Certain dissident Socialists, in revolt against the official leadership, have advocated various departures from the Socialist programs. Though generally based on an accurate analysis of political conditions, these attempts have come to little because the leaders lack support for their proposals. Partly as a result of this failure, the trade union movements have evidenced a trend toward unity of all trade union groups in a single organization, irrespective of political party lines.

8. The Communists have transformed their political strategy in conformity with these new moods and have made striking gains in the resistance groups. In nearly every country they have set up or joined national-front organizations. The strength of the Communist bid for control of specific governments is likely to vary with the degree to which each country falls within the Russian orbit. In general, however, it is probable that once the defeat of the Axis has been accomplished, the Communists will adopt policies demanding fundamental social and economic change.

9. The "pure resistance" groups will be faced with two choices in attempting to maintain their position of leadership in the post-war period. They may constitute themselves a separate organization and seek to put forward a concrete program of political action; or they may prefer to enter traditional parties and seek to operate through them as media. In either event

they face the possibility that once the pressures of occupation have been removed, the emotions and the interests of the resistance will lose their potency, and that they may consequently cease to exist as a political force.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN RESISTANCE BEFORE THE ALLIED INVASION OF FRANCE: THE UNDERGROUND

I. INTRODUCTION

The fight against Nazism has created a new political force in Europe. The resistance, by rallying the politically conscious anti-Nazis in each country around the profound emotions of nationalism and democracy, may well be laying a basic part of the foundations of post-war Europe. The understanding of this new political phenomenon is made difficult because most information about it is scattered, fragmentary and conjectural.

The forms of European resistance vary according to the national circumstances; but, in general, two main types may be distinguished -- underground activity, which has been characteristic of Western Europe; and guerrilla warfare, which is dominant in the Balkans, and which also plays important roles in Poland and Italy, as well as in certain areas of Western Europe, notably that controlled by the French *maquis* and in the Ardennes area in Belgium.

Guerrilla and underground resistance present sufficiently different political problems to require separate treatment. Guerrilla warfare means a sharper break with existing society; it is waged in the open under conditions which place a premium on trained soldiers as leaders; and it tends to encourage a more open avowal of political objectives. Underground resistance -- however centrally organized -- is, in view of the tightness of Nazi controls, local, atomized, and furtive; it is conducted by more or less average persons under cover of normal social life.

The political tendencies of the underground are rendered further obscure by the fact that it provides a form of political experience for which there is no equivalent in the

normal operations of a democracy. Men who live in the dark, without public identity or public recognition, risking their lives daily in the cause of their country, are not to be understood in pre-war political terms. The resistance movements of Europe, determined in their immediate purposes, sometimes suspicious of the Anglo-American powers, filled with strong but undefined desires for fundamental social change, are unknown factors in the peace equation.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the political evolution of the continental underground as distinct from guerrilla movements and to inquire into the extent to which a specific European character is emerging from the European resistance. Such a study should produce some notion as to the direction in which the political weight of resistance will be thrown in post-war Europe and the role the resistance is likely to play in possible conflicts of interest among the United Nations.

II. NATURE OF RESISTANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE

Opposition to the Nazis went underground in each of the countries of Western and Central Europe on the day of capitulation. It exists today in manifold forms. It is carried on in city and country and on all social levels. This report deals primarily with the organized resistance; but it should be recalled that the administrative sabotage and passive non-cooperation practiced, for example, by the doctors or farmers of the Netherlands, or by minor officials in most occupied countries, may in the long run have held up the Nazi war machine almost as much as the more spectacular efforts of the active resistance.

In some countries -- notably in Germany itself, as well as in Austria and Czechoslovakia -- this opposition has remained disorganized and impotent, confining itself pretty much to the maintenance of contact and the achievement

of bare survival. In other countries resistance developed into overt political opposition or violence. In some -- notably in France -- the resistance has built up an organization and acquired a power which may make it a leading voice in the country when the pro-Nazi government is overthrown.

The resistance, though more or less united by hatred of the invader, tends itself to be subjected to internal pressures which divide it into conflicting groups. Some of these lines of division are plainly political, and these will be considered at length later. But some cut across political alignments and in certain respects master them.

The most important non-political division is the one between the "opposition" and the "pure resistance" -- that is, between those who maintain themselves in non-violent opposition to the German occupation, and those who actually blow up bridges, derail trains and shoot German soldiers. This distinction obviously exists only when large-scale violence becomes possible. In Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, for example, there is only "opposition"; there is no significant "pure resistance." In most countries of Western Europe, however, the divergence between the opposition and the pure resistance has become a political fact of some importance.

One of the dominant characteristics of pure resistance is its activism. The basic source of activism appears to be a sense that German rule has become intolerable and further acquiescence impossible. Activism may also be encouraged by Communists anxious to create diversions to relieve the pressure on the USSR, or by criminals anxious to pursue their professions under the guise of patriotism; but fundamentally it rests on a widespread conviction that the moral position of their country in the community of nations requires open resistance. Men cannot stand by and watch

their countries despoiled and their rights destroyed without experiencing a deep personal and national desire for revenge. In particular, the imposition of the labor draft, making inescapable the direct choice between aid to the Germans and resistance, has tended in most countries to give great stimulus to activism.

However prudent a quietist policy may seem in London to exiled leaders carefully calculating the assets and liabilities of premature resistance, experience shows that such a policy fails badly to meet the emotional needs of people suffering under Nazi military occupation. As a result, there has been in every occupied country pressure from below in favor of active resistance, often in opposition not only to the strategy laid down by the exiled governments but even to the preferences of underground political parties, not themselves capable of leading such resistance and perhaps fearing the social consequences of violence. It is this spontaneous demand, not the agitation of Communists nor the anti-social instincts of gangsters, which caused the policy of hoarding resistance for the Allied landings to fail, and which has thus strengthened everywhere the groups calling for active resistance.

The line of separation between the passive opposition and the "pure resistance" is not, of course, absolute. Although the two tend to have different structures, platforms and activities, it is often difficult -- especially in view of the fragmentary intelligence available -- to distinguish between them. This difficulty is augmented by the actual overlapping of organizations, and by the fact that many individuals belong to both.

It may be said in general that pure resistance groups avow national liberation to be the main reason for their existence, while opposition groups regard it as a point

of departure for a political and economic program. Where the opposition then is likely to be under the control of established leaders and even to become the instrument of pre-war parties aiming at strengthening their post-war position is concerned with the immediate task of liberation. Pure resistance is drawing upon spontaneous mass emotions and calling forth new leadership. Where the opposition thus retains a pre-war political character, pure resistance tends to be to this extent indifferent or even antagonistic to party politics. An individual who decides to act in a country dominated by the Gestapo has little choice; he must take the first opportunity open to him and join the organization which by chance he is able to discover, whether or not it has any politics or whether or not they are to his liking.

Organs of opinion -- clandestine newspapers, magazines, pamphlets -- may as well be controlled by the opposition as by the pure resistance. Underground political parties are perhaps more likely to be part of the opposition than of the pure resistance. Consequently neither the underground press nor underground political manifestoes are necessarily accurate reflections of resistance opinion. They may express only the views of the four or five men who wrote them, or they may representsimply the platform of a pre-war party. Even the large circulation of an underground paper may signify more the possession of distribution facilities and the popular hunger for news than it does any widespread endorsement of the paper's politics.

Because the pure resistance is more given to time-bombs than to manifestoes, it is difficult to know the degree of its resentment, if any, toward the opposition. Its proclaimed purpose (as well as its compelling need) is to submerge all differences in the interests of national liberation; and it generally avoids partisan programs or appeals. A

political party, like the Communist, which espouses an activist and "non-political" policy is thus in a good position to penetrate the pure resistance, while the various Socialist and Social Democratic Parties, still preoccupied with advancing traditional programs, are on the whole not represented as such in the pure resistance. But, while Communists often gain key positions in the pure resistance, it is ordinarily at the sacrifice of Communist doctrines -- though their present influence may well give these doctrines new potency after liberation.

The distinguishing attitudes of the pure resistance are thus (1) activism and (2) a "non-party" tinge. In certain cases tension has arisen between the pure resistance and the opposition. A section of the French underground press, for example, has made an invidious distinction between "intellectual" resistance -- the manufacture of programs, the printing of leaflets, armchair directives to the pure resistance -- and "manual" resistance -- sabotage and destruction. In Belgium the line between opposition and pure resistance seem unusually clear, though without any important antagonism.

In Norway the split has assumed somewhat greater proportions as a result of the steadfast adherence of the government-in-exile to a quietist policy. The London government, composed of a party coalition, has in the main confined its appeals to the maintenance of moral opposition and to preparations for active resistance in the indefinite future. Accordingly, as German exactions drove a growing number of Norwegians to desire a more active policy, they turned to organizations which opposed the official line and advocated activism. While the government-in-exile has not openly condemned activism, and the active resistance has not formally repudiated the government-in-exile, the differences between

them are strong enough to cause (at least, until recently) a marked absence of close cooperation.

The divergence between opposition and pure resistance has perhaps become most acute in Denmark. An orderly and law-abiding people, accustomed to pacifism and to respect for authority, the Danes were naturally disinclined at the start to think in terms of violent resistance. This disinclination was reinforced by the apparent certainty of German victory and by the scrupulous care with which Germany endeavored to keep Denmark as a showpiece for the New Order. German policy shrewdly exploited the traditional Danish aversion to political violence; and Danish leaders were prepared to make all manner of concessions -- such as adherence to the anti-Comintern pact, banning the Communist Party, reorganizing the cabinet -- so long as the essential parts of Danish institutional life were allowed to continue.

In return for German restraint Danish leaders cooperated in dissuading the people from active resistance. All the parties in the governing coalition issued periodic appeals for the maintenance of order. The Social Democratic party and the trade unions, for example, denounced strikes and sabotage. From the King down, the entire institutional leadership of the country arrayed itself against activism. On the other hand, it undertook a good deal of obstructionism and administrative sabotage, limited, however, by the desire to preserve the institutions through which the opposition had to be conducted.

The change in the military balance of the war and the increasing pressure of German policy soon caused an increase in the popular demand for action. The very failure of most established political and social institutions to support pure resistance was in part responsible for the incoherence and frequent wastefulness of the activism, and for its isolation

from the organized life of the nation. The fact that activism put the existence of the collaborating institutions in jeopardy intensified the criticism of the pure resistance. The spread of activism thrust to the forefront new leadership, not strongly represented in the pre-war life of the nation, and this further antagonized the existing institutions. The Danish situation is unique, however, in the sharpness of the clash between opposition and pure resistance, for in Denmark alone did German occupation take a form which enabled the collaborationist government to retain an anti-Nazi character in the minds of a considerable portion of its people.

III. CLASS BACKGROUND OF RESISTANCE

The underground war, whether in the form of opposition or of pure resistance, has not been a class prerogative. In virtually every nation men of the Right began to plan for resistance as speedidly as men of the Left. In many cases, indeed, their superior military training, their greater familiarity with the exercise of leadership, their more strategic position with regard to the existing regime, or their greater experience in invoking sentiments of patriotism tended to place them at the start in prominent positions.

In the rudimentary stages of resistance the need for unity is imperative; the struggle for survival commands all available time and energy; political differences seem irrelevant in face of the common danger and in view of the remoteness of liberation. Thus in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia today men of all backgrounds enter resistance without much distinction -- disillusioned Nazis, dissident Junkers, army officers, Catholics, Social Democrats, Communists.

Similarly in the early days in France (where intransigent anti-Germanism was more characteristic of the Right than of the Left) long-standing enemies of the Popular Front were among those quick to organize opposition to the Germans. Combat, for example, one of the largest South Zone resistance groups, was formed originally in 1941 out of two strongly rightist groups. One, headed by Henry Frenay, was predominantly an army group, dedicated to the success of Petain's National Revolution, and convinced that its belief that National Revolution could come only after National Liberation expressed the secret views of the Marshal himself. The second, headed by Francois de Menthon, consisted in the main of anti-German Catholics. Many accounts report the active part played in these early days by royalists, rightists, Catholic priests and other normally conservative persons. De la Rocque, leader

of the royalist-fascist Croix de Feu is now in prison for anti-German activity, and Charles Vallin, one of his lieutenants, joined De Gaulle in London in 1942.

The Low Countries present a fairly united class front against the invader. In Denmark the pure resistance is in the hands of the Conservatives and the Communists. In Norway the existing government was broadened into a coalition immediately after invasion; and again with the exception of the fascist Nasjonal Samling of Vidkun Quisling all sections of the community joined in opposing German occupation.

But, while the spirit of resistance has by no means been a class monopoly, nevertheless as resistance becomes better organized, as the pressures for activism increase, as the possibilities for attentisme narrow, class relations appear to play an increasingly large role. Victorious Nazism has found more collaborators in the possessing classes than anywhere else. Not all possessors have been collaborationists, any more than all the dispossessed have been resisters; yet the business and landholding groups in Western Europe have certainly exercised their general influence in favor of coming to terms with the New Order. The peasants have tended toward passive resistance until the labor draft galvanized many into action. The working classes, who stand to gain the least from Nazi victory, have accordingly tended to provide the most reliable reservoir of pure resistance.

This fact has exerted a determining influence on the character of pure resistance; and the influence has increased as the more systematic organization of resistance emphasized the ultimate dependence upon the working classes. This dependence is less ideological than physical. The blunt facts of underground warfare -- that a man fleeing the Gestapo has a better chance to escape if he vanishes into a working class district, that a high proportion of those

willing to undertake the risks are workers, that trade union organizations present one of the best means of communication and contact -- inevitably color the purposes even of the most determined "non-party" adherents of pure resistance. Gradually the resistance program has had to be reshaped to appeal to the politically active sections of the working classes.

What are the attitudes of the activist sections of the European masses likely to be today?

The answer can be discovered only through a search for uniformities in the accumulation of scattered and fragmentary intelligence. Reports from the underground, statements in the clandestine press, reports from official observers in Bern, Stockholm and Algiers, the success of some political appeals in the occupied countries and the failure of others, the emergence of new attitudes and slogans, the changes and adjustments of German occupation and propaganda policy -- all these sources provide indications which converge to form a fairly clear picture of the sentiments of a great part of the European masses.

The experience of war and German occupation appears to have produced or intensified three dominant attitudes, beyond the general demand for active and "non-political" resistance: (1) a hatred of the invader and the collaborationist; (2) a longing for decent conditions of living; and (3) a revulsion against systematic terror or, indeed, against totalitarian control threatening the dignity of the individual. These three attitudes have been crystallized by the underground into the vague but potent words "national liberation," "socialism," and "democracy" -- words which stand approximately in that order as the common platform of the resistance groups of Western Europe.

The vagueness of the resistance catchwords does not imply that they are loosely held. The necessarily non-party

character of pure resistance, the need for unity, the basic confusion over goals all prevent a more precise definition. But all available intelligence from Western Europe shows that these concrete emotions exist and that they permeate the pure resistance. Their broad result has been to stimulate political desires which, in relation to pre-war Europe, are generally to the left.

The permutations of German occupation policy display an involuntary acknowledgment of this leftward drift. Its recent tendencies have been to initiate pseudo-leftist campaigns -- nominal measures of socialization in Italy, the elevation of anti-capitalist collaborationists like Marcel Déat in France, and a general attempt, led by Goebbels himself, to represent the Reich as the champion of "Socialist Europe" against the western plutocracies and the Bolshevik despotism.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE LEFTWARD DRIFT

The leftward drift has by no means caught every one who entered into resistance in 1940 and 1941. While many conservatives have accepted or even furthered "socialism" and "democracy" in the interests of "national liberation," some have become so alarmed by them that they withhold cooperation from more radical groups, fighting them or even swinging back toward collaboration.

The split between left and right is much more pronounced under the guerrilla conditions in the Balkans than in the pure resistance conditions of Western Europe. Under guerrilla conditions, political differences have a much greater opportunity to come out into the open; the control of territory over a long period, for example, may force a guerrilla group into making political and economic decisions which are bound to alienate somebody. Thus the fight between Tito and Mihailovich in Yugoslavia, between the LNC and the BK in Albania, between the EAM and more conservative resistance groups in Greece, between the "pro-Soviet" and Government undergrounds in Poland display most clearly the growing isolation of the right, and the consequent tendency to protect class interests even at the cost of working with the Germans.

The possibilities of compromise are greater in underground warfare as a result of its greater remoteness from party politics. In France, for example, the fortunes of the originally conservative Combat organization illustrate how the resistance, in spite of itself, has become increasingly oriented in a leftist direction. It became evident to the leadership of Combat through 1942 that a mass resistance movement in France would have to be based primarily on the working class. Accordingly an agreement was reached with the Socialist Party by which its militants could join Combat. This development was paralleled by a steady leftward revision of the Combat

program, till it soon repudiated the principles of the National Revolution which it had originally espoused. By 1943 one-third of its membership was estimated to be Socialist; it had recognized De Gaulle as the leader of French Resistance, outwardly endorsed leftist social objectives and entered into increased cooperation with other leftist resistance organizations.

In France most rightist groups have tended rather to draw closer to the leftist resistance than to return to Vichy. Various Catholic and nationalist elements appear in the pure resistance groups, particularly in Combat and the Organisation Civile et Militaire. Even the Armistice Army, though distrustful of the leftist tendencies in the main body of resistance, has never opposed the resistance groups.

Corresponding rightist groupings have appeared at Algiers. The rightist resistance is represented by Commissioners Frenay and De Menthon and Delegates Hauriou and Ferrière; the underground parties of the Right by Commissioner Jacquinot and Delegate Antier. But their program now differs only in matters of emphasis from that of the Left, laying greater stress on class solidarity and on executive authority. Even on the question of épuration, the rightist resistance (as distinct from rightist exiles, like Giraud) appears to cherish no more indulgence toward collaborationists than the Left.

The same process of concession by the Right has been conspicuous in Italy. At the start, the Badoglio-Victor Emmanuel regime had the advantages, not only of the obvious need for unity and of the loyalty of army and official groups which might have ignored a revolutionary government, but also of strong Allied backing. Nevertheless the need for a more distinctly democratic orientation began to exert itself.

Though the presence of the Germans and the Fascists tended to keep disunity in the north at a minimum, the latent opposition between the rightist groups, who acknowledged the

leadership of Badoglio, and the leftist groups, who followed the Committee of National Liberation, sharpened during the winter and early spring of 1944. In liberated Italy the King and his aristocratic-militarist entourage neared open conflict with the anti-Fascist parties. The result was first the slow and reluctant liberalization of the Badoglio government and then its overthrow.

Throughout Western Europe, this leftward drift, released by the revulsion against enemy occupation, social insecurity and political repression, constitutes the underlying political mood, affecting the pure resistance perhaps more fundamentally even than it does the opposition, for the pure resistance is less committed to pre-war political programs. The specific expression which this mood will ultimately take will depend on the forces which are capable of capturing and mastering it.

V. STRUGGLE FOR POWER WITHIN RESISTANCE: THE RIGHT

The first problem facing a group which seeks to capture the leadership of the European resistance is to adjust its strategy to the tendencies set up by the experience of Nazi occupation. That is, it must be activist and (in the special sense) "non-party" in character, and must be in favor of "national liberation," "democracy," and "socialism,"

The political groups bidding for this leadership have understood the problem with varying degrees of clarity.

Most pre-war political parties have found themselves constitutionally handicapped in the struggle for the leadership of the resistance. Because they have been recognized parties in law-abiding countries, their leadership is not trained to originate and direct programs of terrorism. As parties, they have consequently tended to confine themselves to opposition and stay out of pure resistance. Because they have mostly committed themselves on internal policies, they find it hard to jettison these policies and emerge as champions of national

unity. To some degree the inherent tendencies of resistance have forced them to make concessions -- to support, if not organize, pure resistance; to proclaim, if not practice, national unity; to profess at least a nominal adherence to "socialism" and "democracy." These concessions have probably been enough to assure survival into the post-war period, but hardly enough to win the present leadership of the resistance.

Of the few rightist parties which have gone further, the Danish Unity Party and the Christmas Moeller wing of the Danish Conservative Party have made conspicuously successful adaptations to the new circumstances. It has been pointed out that the desire of the large Danish political parties to retain their tolerated position kept them out of the pure resistance. As a result, the minority groups of the extreme right and left, with no comparable stake in the existing order, provided the chief fund of political leadership available to the activists.

The Moeller wing of the Conservatives was able to make the necessary sacrifice of doctrine and achieve the required "non-party" character because Moeller before the war had already sought to commit his party to a national rather than a class program. Where Moeller's policy had certain neo-fascist implications, the Danish Unity Party had been openly fascist; but after German invasion it jettisoned its fascist ideas, coming out for unconditional resistance. Moeller himself, after helping organize resistance inside Denmark, escaped to England in May 1942 to become head of the Free Danish movement. In the meantime, his followers kept up resistance, adopted a program of unreserved collaboration with the Communists and joined with the Communists and the Danish Unity Party in setting up the Danish Freedom Council. More Conservative leaders have been arrested by the Germans than leaders of any other political group except the Communists.

No other rightist groups have risen to the situation as

ably. It is possible that the numerically small but strategically significant group of ex-rightists around De Gaulle, centered in Colonel Passy and the Bureau Central des Renseignements et de l'Action (BCRA), may be submerging political objectives underneath their general acceptance of the resistance program; or that the "Synarchiste" group in Algiers may cherish political aspirations; but, as yet, there is no real evidence that they are likely to seize control. The Giraud group in France and the Badoglio group in Italy showed consistent inability to take advantage of the opportunities afforded them by the Allies and capture the leadership of the resistance. While unforeseen factors may return the Right to power after the war, there is little evidence at present to indicate that the Right has much to hope for from the resistance.

VI. THE OFFICIAL SOCIALIST PARTIES

In a much better position to bid for the leadership of resistance are the parties of the non-Communist Left. The Socialist and Social Democratic Parties of Western Europe always proclaimed their belief in socialism and in democracy.

Yet the same faults which hampered the Social Democrats before the war have hampered them under German occupation. In most countries they had become as indispensable parts of the fabric of the existing order as the parties of the Right and had developed corresponding vested interests in the status quo. Revolutionary aspirations were retained primarily as a form of ritual, and the Socialist leadership tended to rise on a bureaucratic escalator which placed a premium on the survival of the cautious and the reliable. The need to promote the day-to-day economic interests of the working class led them to adopt a political position which identified the Social Democrats with the status quo. The nature of their position in the political structure led them to concentrate on parliamentary

procedure and the narrow range of traditional labor issues rather than advocating more radical solutions of basic socio-economic problems, in spite of retaining a doctrinaire socialist program.

German occupation was able to exploit the disrepute into which the Social Democrats had fallen not only by attracting some of the keenest critics of the feebleness of parliamentary Socialism, notably Henri de Man, head of the Belgian Socialist Party, but also by taking into camp some of the most whole-hearted exponents of this feebleness, such as Faure and Spinasse of the French Socialist Party. In Denmark, where the Social Democratic Party retains legal existence, it has purchased a precarious immunity by participating in the coalition government and urging its members to abstain from violent resistance.

In most countries the Socialist parties have not risen to the opportunities created by the experience of German occupation. Socialist parties have tended to remain in the opposition, rarely if ever setting up resistance arms of their own, a policy which compels many individual Socialists to join the pure resistance under other leadership. The Socialist program, as expounded in their underground press, remains doctrinaire and inflexible, issuing manifestoes which, with their tireless invocation of Socialist catchwords, are much more echoes of the past than anticipations of the future.

In the Netherlands and in Belgium the Socialist Parties publish flourishing clandestine papers. But there is no evidence that either is taking much part in the pure resistance; and the pronouncements on post-war issues of leading Belgian Socialists, for example, show continued fidelity to traditional methods and ideals.

In France the Socialist party appears to have recovered from its low point when only a minority of Socialists deputies

voted against the grant of full power to Marshal Pétain. The party has been purged and reconstituted underground under the leadership of Andre Philip and Andre Le Troquer; but neither of these men has lived up to expectations at Algiers, and the Socialist representation in the Consultative Assembly is controlled by pre-war leaders, such as Felix Gouin. The rule of seniority, always so powerful in the European Socialist parties, may be hindering the emergence of able younger men like Edouard Froment and Juste Evrard. Within France the party has refrained from establishing a pure resistance arm, with the result that,while individual Socialists make up the bulk of such pure resistance organizations as Liberation, they are in paramilitary groups ordinarily directed by non-Socialists.

The position of the German Social Democratic party, once the most powerful Socialist party in Europe, shows the persistence of characteristics which enfeebled the party under Weimar. Its failure to adjust party strategy to underground work has resulted, according to repeated reports from Germany and from prisoners-of-war, in a profound sentiment among former Social Democrats against reviving the party, with its pre-Hitler personnel, organization and ancient feuds. It is not known how strong a sentiment may exist for its revival in some drastically altered form.

In Norway the Labor Party has similarly lost the initiative to groups more capable of quick adjustment to resistance conditions. The top leadership, by remaining in the government-in-exile and adhering to its quietist policy, has seen the rank-and-file go over to activist groups espousing the cause of "national liberation" and "democracy."

VII. NEW DIRECTIONS ON THE LEFT

The traditional policy of the Social Democratic parties created on the part of many followers a general dissatisfaction with their methods and objectives. It was particularly intense in those countries which fell to fascism internally and in which the weaknesses of the Social Democratic program had thus been especially disastrous. It tended to create new groups on the Left, sharply differentiated from Communism as well as from old-style "Social Democracy."

The first tendency in these circles, it is true, had been toward disillusionment with democracy and with parliamentary methods. Many restless Socialists in the early thirties turned toward dictatorship -- whether National Socialism, as with De Man, or the dictatorship of the proletariat, as with the early Neu Beginnen group in Germany, or Russian Communism. But opposite tendencies soon set in.

Italian and German Socialists thus adopted a socialist-democratic platform now characteristic of the resistance Western Europe. To this they added a fairly concrete economic program based on a determination to avoid what they believed to have been the fatal mistakes of the pre-fascist Socialist leadership in their countries. The great error, they believed, had been the failure to socialize the properties of the great industrialists and financiers who had played so large a role in the rise of fascism. From this experience they now argue the political necessity of immediate socialization in order to safeguard a re-established democracy. Thus "socialism," which is likely in the occupied countries to signify merely a general desire for social security and a higher standard of living, has considerably more specific connotations for many of the Socialists of Italy and Germany.

The Italian Socialists began soon after the triumph of Mussolini to take stock of the causes of their defeat in

1921, resolving that the same factors should not lead them to fumble another opportunity. These weaknesses persisted to some degree: one section of the party, led by Modigliani, maintained its pacifist principles, allied itself with French Socialists of the Faure stripe and has refrained from an activist program.

But another group within the party, led by Pietro Nenni, former party secretary, feeling that disunity was the basic weakness of the Left, has sought to unite Communists, Socialists, trade unionists and liberals in a popular front program. Nenni in recent years has faithfully followed the Communist line, even accepting the pact of 1939. His position in the Committees of Action, which directed underground work from France in 1941, and his general ability won him a high place in Socialist councils. In January 1944 he negotiated a working agreement between the Socialists and Communists, purporting to be a step toward the "political unity of the working classes," the text of which recognizes the laboring class as "the vanguard and the guide of the nation" and the USSR as "the vanguard of the labor movement and the most positive ally of the people." This move toward unity probably corresponds to the desires of the Italian working class. The Nenni group appears to have been in control of the party organization, and its policy of collaboration seems to have thus far provoked no split within the party.

The Italian Socialist Party is thus almost unique among continental Socialist parties in its close ties to the Communists. One small group centering around Ignazio Silone in Bern maintains a fairly dogmatic anti-Communist attitude, but its influence within Italy is conjectural. A potential nucleus of anti-Communism on the Left outside the Socialist Party itself appears to be the Party of Action, which claims to be the successor of the underground group

Giustizia e Liberta.

Giustizia e Liberta began in the thirties as a small, well-disciplined activist resistance group, espousing the extreme republican views associated in this country with Gaetano Salvemini. After the smashing of its organization in Italy by 1939 some of its leaders, notably Emilio Lussu, escaped to France and later, apparently with British help, organized abroad what is now the Party of Action. The present Action Party contains many other elements and has doubtless overstated its relations with the original Giustizia e Liberta group; nor are all the surviving Giustizia e Liberta leaders in the Action Party; but the presence of Alberto Cianca, Alberto Tarchiani and others who for a time persisted in the original Giustizia e Liberta refusal to collaborate with Communists justifies a part at least of the Action Party's claims. Certainly the Action Party today is pushing a left-ist program well adapted to the popular longing for "national liberation," "socialism" and "democracy."

In Germany the left-wing Socialists were critical of the official policy even before the triumph of Hitler, in particular the strategy of postponing ownership questions until the economic crisis was over. Various dissident groups sprang up in the last years of the Republic -- notably the Socialist Workers Party, the Internationale Sozialistische Kampfbund (ISK), and the Miles Group, which later became Neu Beginnen. When the fall of the Republic seemed to them to confirm this analysis, certain of these groups began to organize for resistance. Neu Beginnen, though itself small in numbers, is the best publicized example of the critical tendencies within the Socialist Party. Today, after many ideological changes this group gives the restoration of political freedom and civil rights the highest priority, while still insisting on immediate socialization. The present

position of the left-wing Social Democrats within Germany is not clear and reports on the degree of cooperation between Socialists and Communists vary considerably according to the source.

In Western Europe, where the official leadership has not been completely discredited, the pre-war Socialist Parties are in a more secure position. The new tendencies exist, however. The French Socialist Party, for example, shows signs of nervousness over the possibility of resistance groups with large Socialist membership retaining independent political existence after the war. Resistance Socialists like Louis Vallon may form new factions critical of the party bureaucracy.[1] The Norwegian Labor Party, which has seceded from both the Second and Third Internationals and which has had a fairly strong syndicalist wing within the party, was somewhat more radical than most pre-war Socialist parties; accordingly, though the top leadership has remained inflexible, many party members are harking back to past radical tendencies and, while endorsing a non-political program of resistance, have gravitated toward activism and toward a more class-oriented post-war policy.

In view of the weakness of the groups, and their antagonism to the traditional Social Democratic program, they are faced with the problem of collaboration with the Communists.

In addition to the dissident Socialists, there are a number of small leftist groups of extreme Socialist or Trotskyite inclination who place socialism and the immediate prosecution of the class war ahead of national unity. But there is no evidence that these groups have any significant following in any country.

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1. In Britain, a number of dissident Laborite groups such as the one headed by Aneurin Bevan and centering around the London Tribune; the New Fabians, and the Socialist Discussion Group and, especially, the Commonwealth Party.

Trade unions, however, may provide a more independent basis for political action in post-war Europe than they have in the past. There is a general trend of the trade union movements in Europe to sever their connections with the political labor parties, and to unite all trade union wings (Socialist, Catholic, Liberal, and Communists) into one trade union organization. By this means they hope to regain freedom of action and to achieve the unity of the labor movement in spite of its political divisions. The reconstituted trade union movement may thus become an independent political left-wing force.

In France and Italy, Catholic groups may also provide a basis for new formations on the left. The Christian Democratic Party, successor to Don Sturzo's Italian Popular Party, has taken an active part in resistance; and, while its southern section tends toward conservatism, its northern wing is reported to be projecting programs along advanced lines of Christian Socialism. In France the Catholic Trade Union Federation (CFTC), the Christian Syndicalists, and such Algiers groupings as the Résistants Independents reveal the leftist tendencies among Catholics who have participated in the resistance.

VIII. THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

Of all the groups manoeuvering for the leadership of resistance, the Communists have shown the greatest capacity to adapt their policy to the needs and sentiments of the occupied peoples.

On the basis of intelligence and experimentation, Moscow appears to have hit upon a formula which does, in fact, correspond to the actualities of the anti-fascist state of mind. The history of the Free German movement, in which the Free Germany formula may be followed through its various

produced at a conference of men broadly representative of the nation, including trade unionists, businessmen, intellectuals, Catholics (often priests), monarchists (if relevant), even Social Democrats. The manifesto is characteristically dedicated to "national liberation," "democracy" and "socialism," it appeals for national unity and for activism, and it invokes the three-power agreements adopted at Moscow and Teheran. Special attempts are made to conciliate Catholic and conservative opinion, and the one-time Communist platform of class war and atheism is altogether abandoned.

This Communist-sponsored national front appears in the same guise in a dozen countries: the Front National of France, the Front de l'Independence in Belgium, the National Committee of Resistance in the Netherlands, the Supreme Council of National Union in Spain, the National Council of the Anti-Fascist Union in Portugal, the National Peace Movement Conference in Germany, the National Independence Front in Hungary, the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria, the Provisional Committee of National Liberation in Greece, the National Committee of Liberation in Yugoslavia, the National Liberation Movement (LNC) in Albania, and so on. In a few cases, where Communists have been confronted with an existing national front, such as the French Committee of National Liberation, the various Italian Committees of National Liberation, the Danish Freedom Council, they have joined it.

Within the broad front, the Communists, long accustomed to underground work, have easily assumed positions of leadership in the resistance. The courage, ability and capacity for sacrifice of many Communists have increased their prestige and influence. Their preeminent position in the national-front movements is thus accepted by many who would not accept their political views, simply because they make

phases of development -- from the "First Conference of German Prisoner-of-War Privates and Non-commissioned Officers" through the "National Peace Movement Conference" and the Free Germany Committee of Mexico City to the Moscow Committee -- reveals the patient and shrewd diagnosis upon which the present Communist policy is founded. The Soviet conclusion has evidently been that Communist parties must assume during the occupation period an activist and "non-party" character, and must emerge as the champions of "national liberation," of "democracy" and of "socialism."

Of these three, much the vaguest now is "socialism." Where the dissident Socialists propose fairly concrete economic programs, the Communists have become more and more general in their discussion of property issues, until emigré German Communists denounce emigré Social Democrats for fomenting class war. This Communist policy seems to be based on the belief that economic issues in their traditional form constitute too narrow a basis for mass appeal against Fascism and Nazism. Any post-war government in Europe they apparently feel, will automatically be charged with extensive power over the economy -- enough so that the economy can be controlled without immediate recourse to socialism.

The Communists take an increasingly conservative position on economic issues. Indeed, they tend to make the recognition of the Communist Party and the guarantee of its freedom of action -- that is, "democracy" -- the indispensable condition to which every classical Communist demand may be temporarily sacrificed. The consequence has been the reorientation of CP activities in the free as well as the occupied countries.

In the occupied countries, the Communists employ an effective technique. In practically every European country, at some point, a manifesto has appeared, said to have been

good resistance leaders. Moreover, while on the one hand asserting the "non-party" character of the national fronts, Communists also carry on successful campaigns of self-advertisement, even to the extent of sometimes claiming credit for the work of other groups; and the German policy of calling all active resistance Communist has assisted in the popular tendency to identify Communism and pure resistance.

The participation of the Communists in the national front requires, so far as the future political objectives are concerned, the maintenance of discipline within the Communist group. The distinction drawn, for example, by the Gaullists between Communists who worked in the resistance, like Grenier and Mercier, and those who escaped to Moscow, like Marty and Bonté, appears to have no meaning within the French Communist Party; indeed, the central committee of the Party inside France is supposed to have requested explicitly that Marty be put on the Communist delegation to the Assembly.

The success of the Communists in dominating the resistance movements thus depends on the individual abilities of the national leaders. In France and the Low Countries the Communists have thus far been less given to independent political action. In Norway and Italy, however, where Gubben and Ercoli (Togliatti) have risen to positions of prominence through proven ability, they are likely to remain political factors of some consequence. In Norway, Gubben, perceiving accurately the mood of the Norwegians after two years of German occupation and constructing an organization designed to satisfy this mood, has been able to win many adherents away from the cautious official leadership. So long as he continues on the present Communist line, there is no reason to expect that his influence will markedly diminish.

It is probable that, where the consideration of

maximizing resistance against Nazism exists as a specific military necessity, that is the decisive consideration for the Communists. Where military considerations are not decisive, the Communist policy appears to have two different objectives: in countries which are likely to fall into the orbit of the USSR, the Communists, alone or in coalition with others, are likely to aim at the control of the government; in other European countries, they may merely strive for such strategic positions which would enable them to prevent an anti-Soviet orientation.

It seems likely that socialization is no longer the end of Soviet policy, but a means; and that the Russian attitude toward socialization in the countries of Europe will depend on whether or not a socialist program will perform a useful political function. The USSR is thus free to repudiate or announce socialist intentions according to the special circumstances.

For this reason the hope voiced at present by old-time Social Democrats that the Soviet policy of forming broad national fronts will eventually alienate the resistance has little substance. As soon as this policy shows any signs of repelling more strategic support than it attracts, experience suggests that it may be dropped; if it shows any signs of alienating the resistance, it may go.

It is, however, most likely that after the liberation of the occupied countries has been achieved, the basic economic issue will soon come to the forefront. It seems likely that the Communists will then adopt policies of far-reaching social and economic reforms without which they cannot hope to assume leadership of the labor movement, upon which their political future ultimately rests. These changes will not and need no longer be executed in the pattern of 1917-18. The concentration of power over the economics in

the hands of the state allows for a transition from capitalism to socialization.

The opposite hope, voiced by the right -- that, as soon as the Communists unveil their true intentions, their present following, attracted by their national and democratic professions, will fade away -- may be equally without substance.

IX. CONCLUSION

It seems clear that the Communists have played a greater role in the resistance movement than any other political party. The present favorable position of the Communist parties, however, is by no means certain to be lasting.

The pure resistance groups will be faced with a choice in the post-war period. They may constitute themselves a separate political party, and transform their slogans into a concrete program of political action. Or they may enter the existing political parties, try to win control of them, and try thus to achieve a rejuvenation of the present party structure. On the other hand, the pure resistance groups, with the emotional pressure of enemy occupation removed, may lose their political cohesiveness entirely and cease to exert any political influence.

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Occupied Countries 7.12
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France 7.12
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